Previous articles in this series have examined several aspects of The Health of the Nation. ' We shall look at the document from an economic perspective. We believe that the basis ofthe strategy set out in the green paper-establishing key areas and thereafter setting objectives and targets without ever considering costis seriously flawed.
From an economic perspective there are two criteria for judging the success or failure of a strategy such as that set out in The Health ofthe Nation: efficiency and equity. With respect to efficiency the key consideration is that as resources are always scarce it will never be possible to provide all the health for the nation that we would ideally like. We therefore have to choose which type of health or health care to pursue more and which to hold back on. The goal is to allocate the limited resources for improving health so as to maximise the benefit to society. With respect to equity, we simply note that The Health ofthe Nation says almost nothing.
The strategy
The document sets out suggested key areas which are determined on the basis of three criteria. Firstly, the area must constitute a big health problem; secondly, effective interventions must be available; and, thirdly, it should be possible to set objectives and targets. All three criteria must be met before the subject is judged to be a key area.
What is far from clear is how these three criteria are used to arrive at the choice of the key areas. There is virtually no quantification of the extent to which interventions will be effective-just some hope that targets can be achieved. The difficulty with this approach is simply explained. Intervention in a big problem may need to have only a low effectiveness to do much good in terms of health gains. Similarly, highly effective intervention in a small problem may still do as much good, as is the case with chiropody.2 The document does not make it clear how these factors have been brought together to judge what combination of investment in different areas provides the greatest effectiveness in terms of health gains.
There is also the difficulty that in defining the size of a problem there are two dimensions: premature death and avoidable ill health. The document gives no indication of the relative weight to be attached to these dimensions. A third problem is that if objectives and targets cannot be set for a particular area that debars it from being designated a key area and thereby prevents it from being given high priority.
What is of more fundamental concern, however, is that the costs of implementation are not considered in deciding on a key area or what the target should be.
Thus if an area presents a big health problem, has effective interventions, and is targetable, whether the interventions are expensive is deemed irrelevant. That seems particularly bad logic when resources are scarce.
An alternative
Fortunately there is an alternative and it is simple. A successful strategy must consider the size of problem together with the potential quantified impact of EtJectve nmterventon in a small problem can produce large health gains interventions so that a benefit is estimated; must use some weighting to identify the relative importances of saving life and reducing morbidity; must take costs of interventions into account; and must weigh up use of resources in one way against their use in other competing areas. Key areas should be selected on the basis that more resources are better spent there than elsewhere or that more resources are better spent there even at the expense of reducing the resources for another area. This last point is one that the document signally fails to pick up, indeed passes over rather glibly. Thus in the foreword William Waldegrave states: "It must be right to redouble our efforts to reduce avoidable disease and premature death. This must not, however, be at the expense of caring for ill people...."
Our proposal overcomes all the problems we have highlighted above. If more resources are to be spent on health then we need an indicator that allows us to assess the effectiveness of using them in one area compared with that in another. Though measuring health status -for example, through quality adjusted life years (QALYs)-is not yet an exact science and indeed never will be,3 at least many health status measures address the right issue in that they bring together mortality and morbidity in a single index. We suggest that measures of health be combined with information on costing to allow "marginal cost per QALY" to be assessed-for example, ifwe spend Lx more how many QALYs do we get from intervening on this problem and how many from intervening on another problem? And where extra resources can buy most QALYs that is where the resources should be allocated.4
This simple approach to a health strategy would allow the health of the nation to be improved to the greatest extent whatever resources are available.5 Yet the strategy document fails to get even close to such an approach. As a result it is flawed in its central logic.
Objectives and targets
A large part of the document is concerned with the objectives for the chosen key areas and what the quantified targets are. With respect to the objectives we suggest that there is a case for re-examining these often rather vague statements to see whether they represent the true objectives of the population. For example, the objective for the cancer programme is stated as, "To reduce death and ill-health from cancers." However, the emphasis is on screening for breast cancer and cervical cancer. Although whether the emphasis is justified is debatable, what is more important is to recognise the concept of reassurance or avoidance of anxiety in such screening programmes. For these health services and many others there is more to the objectives than just health.6
The targets given in the green paper are in practise quantification ofthe objectives. The target for coronary heart disease, for example, is a 30% reduction nationally in death in people aged under 65 years. Why 30%? Why not 40% or 28%? The basis for many of the targets seems to be: "This is where we are heading according to current trends. So if we set the target just a bit better than that, then maybe we can present the challenge to get there." That is a rather appealing way of looking at the issue, but we would question whether it is a sensible way of planning the health of a nation. If the target were set at 28% for deaths from coronary heart disease, what would the implications be for use of resources? And if it were 40% -would it mean that far too many resources were spent on coronary heart disease in the sense that the loss of opportunity would be too high in other programmes? These key issues are not even raised, far less answered, in the strategy document.
Thus the targets are not based on efficiency concerns and consequently are most unlikely to promote efficient use of resources in the future health strategy. The good intentions on which the document is based are admirable. The question is whether they are an adequate basis for promoting the health of the nation. In his foreword to The Health of the Nation the secretary of state throws down a gauntlet not only to the NHS but also to Whitehall. He reminds ministers and politicians, as well as the NHS and the people it serves, that it is the responsibility of his office to "take all such steps as may be desirable to secure the preparation, effective carrying out and coordination of measures conducive to the health of the people."' The challenges are immense. How to ensure that the NHS uses its finite resources to provide services that are clinically effective, appropriate for each patient's needs, responsive to user preferences, and value for money. How to jolt other central government departments out of their constitutionally established sectional interests and into a commitment to better health. And how to set the process in a framework which is genuinely democratic and participatory and thus more likely to deliver better health.
Can The Health of the Nation offer the first step towards a comprehensive health strategy for England? We believe that it can, but only if the government is prepared to recognise and respond to the criticisms of the document and then establish a long term planning and implementation strategy. It must also take steps to ensure early integration of the strategy into both NHS and multisectoral activities.
The criticisms
Criticism of The Health ofthe Nation is becoming an industry, with critics coming from all sides. We have summarised what we consider to be five key criticisms and indicated the ways we think the government should respond.
Although the document describes progress on the World Health Organisation European region 38 targets, the approach has been criticised for failing to encompass the WHO global strategy for Health for All initiated in 1977,2 and for not building on international experience in developing local Health for All strategies (which have been summarised in a publication from the Department of Health's operational research service.3 Thus, The Health of the Nation does not, for example, refer to the essential prerequisites for achieving the health targets: peace and freedom from fear of war, equal opportunities for all, and the satisfaction of basic needs (adequate food and income, basic education, safe water and sanitation, decent housing, secure work, and a satisfying role in society). Sceptics, many of whom are highly committed to the concept of a health strategy, have described the government's approach as too narrow and overmedicalised.
In particular the document has been criticised for failing to deal with strategic issues relating to inequalities. Equity and participation are stressed in Health for All strategies but not in The Health of the Nation. Health inequalities are real and associated primarily with income, social networks and perceived social worth, and lifestyle.4 The variables are linked but each also operates independently.
The next criticism has been expressed in two opposite directions. Firstly, that the strategy focuses too much on the NHS and, secondly, that it focuses too much on other sectors. The temptation to interpret equal noise on both sides as a positive sign should be resisted as an effective strategy needs to balance both elements. There are clear opportunities for the NHS to use its resources more effectively to achieve health gain, but it can have only limited impact on wider health problems.
Harsher critics have described The Health of the Nation as little more than pre-election political flannel, though this was not the view of the shadow health secretary Robin Cook; he welcomed the initiative. But
